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From Stratfor.
Summary
Claims and counterclaims of defections among the Taliban reflect the heightened power struggle between the government and the guerrillas. But Kabul's latest ploy will fail.
Analysis
Taliban spokesperson Hamid Agha denied a claim that senior members of his organization have defected and are now working with the government of Afghan President Hamid Karzai, the Afghan Islamic Press reported Oct. 23. A day earlier, a government spokesman in Kabul, Jawed Ludin, said several senior members of the Taliban, including former Foreign Minister Wakeel Ahmed Muttawakil, had offered their support for Karzai's regime.
The government claims of defection and the Taliban's denials are part of an ongoing power struggle inside Afghanistan. Karzai, in cooperation with the United States, is hoping to fracture the Taliban by creating doubt and uncertainty within its ranks. Karzai's ploy to rupture the Taliban will fail, though, because the people his government is advancing no long represent the Taliban and do not have the guerrillas' support.
Karzai's government is under immense pressure to break the Taliban's back before the group can reconstitute itself and threaten the stability of his regime. Moreover, the government will hold elections in 2004 after the Loya Jirga, Afghanistan's tribal consultative council, convenes. Karzai, who was appointed by the United States, needs to get the Taliban under control before he runs for re-election. It will be the first time he has contested a national election -- and he has even hinted at forming a political party.
In a free and fair election, Karzai has a bi-level problem. His re-election depends upon the support of the Pushtuns, which are closely tied to the Taliban. The Pushtun community accounts for approximately 40 percent of Afghanistan's 23 million people and is the country's single-largest ethnic group. Karzai, who is an ethnic Pushtun, first needs to emerge as the top leader at the ethnic Pushtun level; only then will he be able to retain his position as president at the national level.
The Taliban is not the same organization it was before Oct. 7, 2001. With its ouster following the U.S. invasion, the group lost control of key resources, including communications facilities, revenues and power of coercion. As a fugitive guerrilla movement, the Taliban must operate clandestinely. In addition, the group's supreme leader, Mullah Omar, is on the run. He can neither move around freely nor communicate easily with his followers because the use of certain communication technologies might betray his location to government and U.S. forces.
Despite this, Taliban forces have sustained some level of operational capability. In the past year, the guerrilla movement has waged an unrelenting campaign aimed at dislodging local and regional militias loyal to Karzai. In fact, the organization has a solid command structure -- delegated by Omar to his field commanders despite limited communications -- and continues to be popular among Pushtun tribes.
The Taliban leadership in the countryside might not be worried about Muttawakil and a few former allies shifting loyalties to Karzai. But at the same time, the militant Islamist cleric Omar cannot ignore Karzai's claims, either.
As a fugitive, Omar relies on the mythology of the Taliban and its cohesiveness as much as its actual operational capability. He needs to reassure three types of audiences -- foreign benefactors, domestic supporters and the rank and file internally -- that there is no problem. Though Omar is not afraid of Taliban desertions, any sign that the group is losing its momentum could lead to the erosion of its support base, logistics and supply networks and sympathizers among the Pushtun tribes. This is what Karzai wants.
His ploy is aimed at winning over the Pushtuns. By alleging that the government has support from within the Taliban's senior leadership, Kabul hopes to fracture the group, cause an internal war that leads to the destruction of Omar's leadership and loyalists and leave a faction sympathetic to Karzai in power.
The president is betting that the winds of allegiance can and will shift in his favor and he likely chose Muttawakil because he is the most senior Taliban official in custody who is willing to strike a deal. Karzai -- and his supporters in Washington -- know they cannot beat the Taliban militarily and so are now trying to outflank the guerrilla group politically by fracturing it from within.
However, choosing Muttawakil as a means for winning support among the Pushtun is a sign of desperation, as he does not have the support of the Taliban rank and file.
Muttawakil was viewed as a moderate within the Taliban regime, and as foreign minister, he often served as a spokesperson for the regime on the international stage but was more of an apologist than a defender of his government's radical Islamist nature. Muttawakil opposed the Taliban's alliance with al Qaeda and privately asked Omar not to work with Osama bin Laden's group.
In February 2002, Muttawakil surrendered and was in U.S. custody until after his early October meeting with U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs Richard Armitage, the Pakistani English language daily the Nation reported Oct. 6. The Taliban is quick to denounce anyone who defects, and a fighter who surrenders is considered a traitor. It's not unlikely that the group would be targeted Muttawakil for assassination. In other words, Muttawakil -- the only "senior Taliban member" to defect, according to the Karzai government claims -- is merely a U.S. lackey. He is not likely someone to garner broad support for Karzai in the struggle to win Pushtun hearts and minds.
Muttawakil also is too closely connected with the U.S. and Karzai governments to have any credibility among the Pushtun tribes. The Taliban can easily play the "erosion of culture" card against Muttawakil and the regime in Kabul to counter potential dissent within the ranks.
A surge in guerrilla fighting and the upcoming elections has set the clock ticking for Karzai. Both Kabul and Washington know that eventually the Taliban and its allies must be either beaten or co-opted, hence Kabul's ploy to woo the more moderate elements. However, the honey Karzai is offering -- Muttawakil -- won't be sweet enough to attract Taliban fighters from the field.