There was also a bloody firefight in the northern city of Samarra. It was labeled the deadliest fighting since the fall of Saddam Hussein. A major battle erupted between U.S. troops, using armor and artillery, and a substantial formation of Iraqi guerrillas. According to a U.S. spokesman, 46 guerrillas were killed, 18 were wounded and 8 captured -- the U.S. toll was five wounded. A spokesman for the 4th Infantry Division said that the engagement began as a coordinated attack by uniformed guerrillas on two separate U.S. supply convoys moving on either side of Samarra. The guerrillas blocked the road and then opened fire from all directions with mortars, rocket propelled grenades and other small arms. The U.S. moved up Abrams and Bradley fighting vehicles and returned fire.The attack in Samarra does not, on the surface, make a great deal of sense. The guerrillas must have known that the 4th Infantry Division's Task Force Ironhorse -- the one apparently hit -- had armored fighting vehicles nearby. Any concentration of guerrilla forces would invite massive U.S. firepower. This is the kind of engagement that the United States can't lose and the guerrillas can't win. The guerrillas' strength is in very small unit actions that hit a target and rapidly withdraw. Standing and fighting U.S. forces is doing the Americans a favor.
There are two possible explanations for this behavior. The first is that the U.S. convoy was probing an extraordinarily sensitive area and the guerrillas had no choice but to engage to screen the withdrawal of the more valuable asset. Saddam Hussein immediately comes to mind, but frankly, U.S. forces might have been getting close to a range of valuable assets and the ambush was designed to buy time for a withdrawal. If that is the case, we will not be seeing many more of these.
The other explanation fits in with the attacks on non-U.S. personnel. The Iraqi guerrillas realize they are running out of time. The U.S.-Kurdish-Shiite alliance is becoming operational and the guerrillas' read of the political landscape is that they are about to be caught between a rock and a hard place. In addition, the guerrillas understand that their resources are limited and that attrition, over time, plays against them.
Or, perhaps, they thought they'd give it a go, show their allegiance to their fave Dictator-tot-in-hiding, the Saddamster.
I concede that Stratfor's people are probably paying closer attention than I am, but I can think of at least a couple of missing options:
4) US psy-ops to boost US morale
US says major firefight with 46 dead 8 captured^W^W^W^W 54 dead 0 captured a la the five-o'clock follies in that other guerilla war. when the bodies are actually counted it turns out that... what? what really happened? how many died? who were they? we'll never know.
5) Iraqi psy-ops to boost recruitment
Iraqis draw fire towards civilian buildings. a few guerillas die and a lot more civilians get pissed off at the occupation. whenever the US shoots the place up it's a win for the insurgents, especially if they use the big guns.
not to mention the Just Plains. just plain fog of war? just plain robbery conducted by idiots? just plain "fedayat" conducted by loyalists? just plain blind rage?
there is now some doubt about whether the firefight involved as many guerillas as CentCom originally claimed, and in view of the recent "their throats were slit"/"no they weren't" weirdness I think all descriptions of engagements need to be treated as suspect. I don't doubt that the poor kids in the 4th ID let rip with everything they had as soon as they came under fire, but the rest of the story could easily be nonsense.
the sensitive asset explanation is a good one though. and I agree that the Sunnis who are presumably responsible for most of the attacks are, uh, sweating bullets so to speak. in fact unless there is all-out civil war, I think we can regard their days as numbered.
That was my thought as well.