Building an empire

This is interesting not only from the standpoint of the Israeli negotiations. The United States now has produced a model that we will call Karzaization, named after Afghan President Hamid Karzai, whose position was invented by the United States after the war in Afghanistan. Karzaization is a political condition in which the primary -- sometimes only -- legitimacy of a national leader is his selection and dependency on the United States for his office. In the extreme case of Karzaization, Karzai is not able to move around the country without heavily armed U.S. forces or U.S.-controlled forces.

Karzaization can exist in one of two forms. In one form, Washington simply parachutes in someone it considers satisfactory, and he is declared "His Excellency." The United States was engaged in Karzai-ing Ahmad CAzaelabi of the Iraqi National Congress. Another way to get Karzai-ed is to become so heavily involved with the United States that your legitimacy declines domestically, and you become heavily dependent on Washington for your survival. Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf is in danger of becoming Karzai-ed, although he is not there yet. It should be noted that becoming Karzai-ed is not the same as developing a U.S. dependency. The emir of Kuwait and British Prime Minister Tony Blair exist in a dependency relationship with the United States, but are not Karzai-ed, because they have their own domestic political bases. A Karzai has no political base except for U.S. patronage.

Abbas seems to be an extreme case of Karzai. He is the prime minister of the Palestinian National Authority, but has no faction he controls. Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad and even the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine all have leaders who derive their strength and positions from the strength and positions of their organizations. Abbas, having no organization to call his own, derives his strength from being selected by the United States. That is not a trivial position. However, his problem is that unlike Marwan Baghouti, who is seen as in control of the Al Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade, Abbas does not control the United States. There is very little he can deliver from Washington, and all the other negotiators know this. Therefore, when the discussions come down to the wire, U.S. National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice takes over for Abbas and speaks for the United States. At that moment, Abbas is not speaking for anyone but himself.

There is a general strategic problem built into Karzai-ing leaders. The United States has invaded Iraq and Afghanistan and has made itself a stakeholder in the Israeli-Palestinian confrontation. In all three cases, the United States has wanted to create a government that both represents the nation and serves the interests of the United States. That did happen in Japan and Germany, but the key was that the interests of postwar Japan and Germany were in fact aligned with the United States. With their governments gone and the Soviet threat very real, collaboration with the United States was the only option. But in Germany and Japan, the defeat was absolute. There was no resistance thereafter.

In Afghanistan and Iraq, there has not been an absolute suppression of resistance. Moreover, it is not clear to many people in either country that their interests and those of the United States are aligned. Therefore, the figures the United States selected to represent Afghanistan and Iraq are neither seen as effective nor inevitable. The same is true with Abbas and will ultimately be the case with Musharraf if the trend continues for another year or two.

Former West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer was not a Karzai, because (1) the United States and its allies had eliminated all options in the former West Germany, (2) when a country is helpless, its interests and that of its occupier's coincide in practical ways and (3) Adenauer was seen as heavily influencing the United States -- he had the ability to make demands and have them satisfied.

The United States needs leaders such as Adenauer, not Karzai. To achieve this goal, an enemy nation must be smashed to bits, its interests aligned with those of the United States in the sense that there is no hope of recovery except through the United States and, finally, the leader cannot be the U.S. messenger boy -- he has to be the leader. Otherwise, you have someone to send to International Monetary Fund meetings, while U.S. troops carry the load.

Empires are not built on direct military rule using discredited puppets. They are built through constructing coalitions within countries that are prepared to rule on beAzaelf of the imperial power. They also are not built in a day -- or in two months. But they should start emerging after two years. And the case of Karzai in Afghanistan is not a promising example. The problem in Afghanistan is this: The United States has neither the power to impose its wishes throughout Afghanistan nor the ability to create solid coalitions. So, it governs through a Karzai, which is the same as not governing at all. The United States is searching for a different model in Iraq, looking for an alternative to CAzaelabi. It is in Israel, where the United States has staked so much in a thoroughly Karzai-ed Abbas, that the dilemma is deepest. U.S. officials don't like the other Palestinian players, so they decided to invent their own. We sAzaell see what the next move brings.